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SATCHER v. COMMONWEALTH
1992 Va. LEXIS 98
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Michael Charles Satcher was convicted of the robbery, assault and
battery, and attempted rape of Deborah Abel, and the robbery, rape, and
capital murder of Ann Borghesani. Acting under Virginia Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3A:6(b), the trial court joined the trial of the two
offenses, finding that they were sufficiently connected in time, place, and
means of commission not to warrant separate trials. Both incidents
occurred on or near abicyclepath inArlington County, on March 31,1990.
At approximately 7 p.m. on March 31, Deborah Abel was pulled off
of her bicycle by an assailant, dragged into a ditch, beaten, and partially
disrobed in an attempt to commit rape. Another bicyclist interrupted the
attack and pursued the assailant who escaped with Ms. Abel's purse.
Ann Borgesani had an engagement for which she never appeared at
about 8 p.m. that same evening which in all likelihood would have required
her to walk along the bicycle path to a nearby train station. The following
morning, her body was discovered at the bottom of a stairwell in an office
building adjacent to the bicycle path. She had been raped, robbed of her
jewelry, and stabbed repeatedly by an instrumentwith asharp tippedblade.
The police found Ms. Borgesani's shoe on the bicycle path and discovered
her purse, and Deborah Abel's purse, in a nearby parking lot.
Four and one-half months later on August 18th, Virginia authorities
arrested Satcher on another bicycle path in Arlington County for offenses
he had committed on that day. Although the police did not mention the
Borgesani murder, Satcher volunteered that he believed the police were
"trying to frame [him] for murder or something or a rape or something."
Investigators found a weapon in Satcher's car which could have produced
similar wounds to the ones Ms. Borgesani sustained. DNA testing
matched semen removed from Ms. Borgesani with blood taken from
Satcher.
The jury convicted Satcher in the joined proceeding where he
received sentences of life plus ten years, twelve months, and two terms of
life imprisonment for the non-capital offenses of which he was convicted
involving Ms. Abel and Ms. Borgesani. The jury, finding both statutory
aggravating factors of"vileness" and"future dangerousness" to bepresent,1
imposed the death penalty for the capital murder of Ms. Borgesani.
Satcher appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia claiming that the
trial court erred in not granting his motion for separate trials in violation
of Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, 3A: 10(b) and 3A:6(b). 2 Satcher
also claimed that the trial court erred in disallowing a question at the voir
dire stage related to aprospectivejuror's inability to impose a life sentence
in a brutal murder case such as this. Additionally, Satcher fashioned a
number of arguments based upon the Commonwealth's use of DNA
evidence: that his case was prejudiced by jurors' preconceived notions
1 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2264.4(C) (1990).
2 Rule 3A:10(b) provides that all pending offenses may be joined
if "justice does not require separate trials." Rule 3A:6(b) states that
joinder is permissible if the offenses are "based on the same act or
transaction, or on two or more acts or transactions that are connected or
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan."
3 Satcher v. Commonwealth, Nos. 920247 and 920248, 1992 Va.
LEXIS 98 at *74 (Sept. 18, 1992).
4 Id. at *10.
5 Id.
6 Id. at*17.
7 Id. at "19 - *27.

about the reliability of DNA evidence; that the DNA evidence which the
Commonwealth offered was unreliable; and that the statute which permits
the use of such evidence, Section 19.2-270.5 of the Virginia Code, was
unconstitutional on a number of grounds: (1) that it is unconstitutional
facially because the statute shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, (2)
that it is unconstitutionally vague, leaving too much discretion in the hands
of the judge, and (3) that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
because it denied Satcher his rights to due process and confrontation.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed all of Satcher's claims and
affirmed the convictions and sentences. 3 With respect to the motion for
separate trials, the Virginia Supreme Court held that "the two or more acts
involved in this case constituted parts of a common scheme or plan, and
were closely connected in time, place, and means of commission." 4
Further, the court held that there was not significant danger that the
Commonwealth relied on the strong evidence of one offense to improve its
case with respect to the second offense; therefore, the interests of justice
did not demand separate trials. 5
The court dismissed Satcher's argument that the trial court had
improperly prohibited defense counsel's detailed question during voir dire
asking whether jurors would impose the death penalty under hypothetical
circumstances identical to Satcher's case. 6 Nor did the court find reversible error in the trial court's decision to allow certain jurors with an alleged
predisposition to the death penalty to be empaneled. The court found
nothing improper in the voir dire record and deferred to thejudgmentof the
7
trial judge.
The court dismissed Satcher's contention thathis case wasprejudiced
by juror preconceptions on DNA evidence, holding that the opinions
expressed by jurors were in accord with the established practice in Virginia
favoring the use of DNA evidence. 8 The court rejected Satcher's general
objection questioning the reliability of DNA evidence, stating that the
issue had been settled in Spencer v. Commonwealth,9 and that the actions
of the Virginia General Assembly in codifying the reliability of DNA
evidence confirmed this ruling. 10 The court also rejected various claims
by Satcher that the prosecution had improperly utilized DNA expert
11
testimony.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Motion for Separate Trials

8 Id. at "18 -"19.
9 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1093
(1990) (Spencer 111).
10 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-270.5 (1990).
11 Satcher assigned additional errors. Some of these the court
treated in conclusory fashion, while others did not involve death penalty
law or are unlikely to arise often because they revolved around facts
peculiar to this case. These issues which will not be discussed in this
summary, include: objections based on pretrial discovery matters, the
admissibility of several witnesses' identifications, sufficiency of the
evidence, a passion and prejudice argument based on the nature of the
murder (a black defendant and a white victim), and an argument that the
sentence was excessive and disproportionate.
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The issue ofwhetherSatchershould havebeen tried seperately forthe
Abel incident and the Borgesani murder rests on an interpretation of the
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rules in question in this case
are Rule 3A:10(b): "The court may direct that an accused be tried at one
time for all offenses then pending against him, ifjustice does not require
separate trials... "and Rule 3A:6(b): "Two or more offenses ... may be
charged in separate counts of an indictment or information ifthe offenses
are based on the same act or transaction, or on two or more acts or
transactions that are connected or are parts of a common scheme or plan."
The Satchercourt insisted that the acts in this case clearly constituted
part of a common scheme or plan. The court agreed with the Commonwealth that the offenses were sufficiently similar in time, place, and, most
significantly, the apparent criminal intent of the perpetrator in order to
warrantjoinder.1 2 The court dismissed Satcher's claim that the Commonwealth used the cumulative effect of the two similar incidents to improve
a generally weak case. 13 Furthermore, the court disagreed with Satcher
that justice required separate trials, noting thatjoinder of offenses was the
more just alternative, and that such decisions remain within the discretion
14
of the trial court.
Alternatively, the court held that a violation of rles 3A:10(b) and
3A:6(b) will be reversible error only if the substantive rights of the
defendant have been violated, and found that no such violation had
occurred in Satcher's case. 15 Relying on Coe v. Commonwealth,16 the
court noted that the probative value of the Abel evidence would have
outweighed its prejudicial effect and, therefore, would have been admissible in the Borgesani case anyway. Since the Commonwealth could have
offered evidence of the Abel attack during a separate trial of the Borgesani
murder, the joinder of the offenses did not, according to the court, rise to
17
the level of reversible error.
The dissent, however, argued that the trial court erred in its denial of
the motion for separate trials. 18 Citing Walker v. Commonwealth,19 the
dissent argued that in order to join offenses over the defendant's objection,
the Commonwealth must offer an unbroken chain of evidence. 20 The
Commonwealth failed, according to the dissent, to offer any substantial
connection between the attack on the bicycle path and the murder in the
nearby office building.
The dissent perceived a shift away from established principles of
joinder in the majority decision. Unlike the majority, the dissent argued
that a heavy burden rests with the Commonwealth to prove that the crimes
"are 'so intimately connected and blended with the main facts adduced in
evidence, that they cannot be departed from with propriety... ,.,21
Moreover, the dissent contended the Virginia Supreme Court had made
clear in Day v. Commonwealth22 that if the only relevancy of other
allegedly related crimes "is to show the character of the accused or his
disposition to commit an offense similar to that charged," then that
evidence is inadmissible. 23
The Satcher decision indicates that the Virginia Supreme Court will
generally defer to the trial court's discretion as to when to join offenses.
However, the strongly worded dissent indicates an audience for a less
permissive interpretation of Virginia's joinder rules. Defense counsel
must make a pretrial motion for separate trials before trial in order to avoid
waiving that right. Whether or not to make such a motion for separate trials
is an important tactical decision for defense counsel. Acquittal on the

greater oftwo charges in ajoined trial may have a "coattail" effect and carry
the weak one with it. Moreover, agreeing to a joint trial may put the
defendant in a better bargaining position with the prosecution, and lesser
charges may be dismissed altogether. However, a decision not to move for
separate trials may be prejudicial as the jury may be influenced by the
cumulative effect ofthe charges, and conviction on one charge could lead
the jury to convict on the other.
In a capital trial, joinder of offenses offers fewer advantages. For
example, the Commonwealth charged Satcher with murder during the
course of an attempted rape.24 At the sentencing stage, Satcher's case
certainly suffered under the cumulative effect of his apparent "one-mancrime wave." 25 Had defense counsel been able to have the Abel and
Borgesani matters tried separately, the jury's likelihood of imposing death
may have been lessened, especially with respect to finding future dangerousness.
In order to have charges tried separately, defense counsel must show
that the incidents sought to be joined do not constitute a common plan.
Such a strategy involves a fact intensive argument and requires a thorough
investigation of the incidents in question. Defense counsel should distinguish their cases from Satcher and should argue, as the dissent did in
Satcher, that Satcher represents a departure from settled principles of
joinder and should not be followed. Finally, becausejoinder may have due
process implications, any objections tojoindermust be stated both in terms
of the Virginia statute and on federal and state constitutional grounds.

12 Satcher, 1992 Va. LEXIS 98 at *10.
13 Id. at -9.
14 Id. at 13.
15 Id.
16 231 Va. 83, 87 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).
17 Satcher, 1992 Va. LEXIS 98 at "13.
18 Id. at *:75(Hassell, J., dissenting).
19 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574 (1829).
20 Satcher, 1992 Va. LEXIS 98 at *77, (Hassell, J.,
dissenting).
21 Id.at *,78 (quoting Kirkpatrickv. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269,
276, 176 S.E.2d 802, 807-808 (1970) (quoting Walker, 28 Va. (1 Leigh)
at 576)).

22 196 Va. 907, 914, 86 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1955).
23 Satcher, 1992 Va. LEXIS 98 at *84 (Hassel, . dissenting).
24 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (1991).
25 Satcher, 1992 Va. LEXIS 98 at *71.
26 Id. at *18.
27 Va. Code Ann. §19.2-270.5 (1990). "In any criminal proceeding, D.N.A. . . . testing shall be deemed to be a reliable scientific
technique and the evidence of a D.N.A. profile comparison may be
admitted to prove or disprove the identity of any person .... "
28 Satcher, 1992 Va. LEXIS 98 at *34 (quoting Dooley v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 32, 35, 92 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1956)).
29 Id. at *38.

II. The Use of DNA Evidence
A. Juror Bias Towards DNA
Satcher argued that jurors have preconceived notions about the
reliability of DNA evidence that prejudice defendants. The court dismissed this contention, stating that all jurors will carry some preconceived
notions with them into a case.26 Even if potential jurors exaggerate the
reliability of DNA evidence, the Virginia Supreme Court and the General
Assembly have decided that DNA evidence is reliable. As a result, the
court concluded that such exaggeration by jurors was consistent with the
approach mandated under Virginia law.
B. Reliability and Admissibility of DNA Evidence
Satcher also made a general attack on the reliability of DNA evidence. He claimed that the statute which always permits DNA evidence
to be introduced into evidence 27 was unconstitutional because it improperly shifted the burden ofproof to the defendant to show that the evidence
was not reliable. The court dismissed this contention, stating that the
statute "'merely creates a rule of evidence and does not determine the guilt
of the accused."' 28
Satcher proceeded to argue that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied, and violated his rights to due process, confrontation, and a fair
trial, because it allowed the Commonwealth to rely on inherently unreliable evidence. The court held that despite these claims, the trial judge
properly allowed the question ofreliability to be decided by the jury after
hearing expert testimony from both sides. 29
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Few subjects create as much controversy as the admissibility and
reliability of DNA evidence in the context of a criminal trial. Although
most jurisdictions apply the rule ofFrye v. UnitedStates3 0 - that a new
scientific technique must be both reliable and generally accepted by the
scientific community - Virginia uses the relevancy standard, which
evaluates evidence according to logical relevancy, and excludes it only if
its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. 31 In a series of cases
culminating with Spencer v. Commonwealth,32 the Virginia Supreme
Court held that DNA evidence is a relevant and reliable scientific technique, and therefore such evidence is admissible. Though DNA evidence
has notyet reached the level ofreliability thata fmgerprint carries, this type
of evidence will be a part of criminal trials for the foreseeable future.
General arguments at trial that DNA evidence is inherently unreliable
are likely to fail as they did in Satcher. As a result, objections by defense
counsel must address flaws in the process itself. Defense counsel should
be familiar enough with the procedures of DNA testing that major flaws
in testing procedures can be identified and articulated. Errors may occur
depending on how samples are collected and preserved, the quality and
quantity of the sample, and what method of DNA testing was used. For
example, certain DNA tests require a greater quantity ofgenetic materials
33
in order to make a reliable match than others.
Defense counsel must guard against the false conclusions that the jury
may draw from statistical evidence offered by DNA experts. For example,
testing laboratories have extensive samples from European-Americans
and African-Americans, but do not have the same data from Asians and
Native Americans, and making reliability projections in such cases might
be misleading. Other issues that defense counsel should be aware of
include: the duty of the Commonwealth to properly preserve essential
evidence, the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing independent
DNA testing, whether or not the prosecution will use DNA evidence, and
the possible conflicts of interest inherent in expert testimony from people
34
trying to sell their technology to law enforcement agencies.
III. Voir Dire and Predisposition to the Death Penalty
Defense counsel attempted to ask the following question during voir
dire:
If we have a situation in which a young woman is raped, robbed
by a person armed with a deadly weapon, stabbed twenty-one
times, beaten and murdered .... in that type of situation do any
of you believe that imposition of the death penalty would be the
30 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
31 See O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,695-96,364 S.E.2d
491, 504, cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 186 (1988).
32 238 Va. 563,385 S.E.2d 850 (1989) cert. denied493 U.S. 1093
(1990) (SpencerlllI). See case summary of SpencerIII, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2., p. 10 (1990). See also Spencer v. Commonwealth,
238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied493 U.S. 1093 (1990)
(SpencerI1), and case summary of Spencer H, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 13 (1989); and Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275,
384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (Spencerl),
and case summary of Spencer!, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1,
p. 13 (1989). A fourth case, Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393
S.E.2d 609 (1990), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 281 (1990) (Spencer IV),
involved an entirely different type of D.N.A. analysis.
33 See Spencer IV, 240 Va. at 95, 393 S.E.2d at 620 (1990).
34 See Lonsbury, The Current State of DNA Evidence, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 11 (1992).
35 See Pattersonv. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653,657,283 S.E.2d
212,214 (1981) and Buchananv. Commonwealth,238 Va. 389,402,384
S.E.2d 757, 765 (1989). See case summary of Buchanan, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 16 (1989).

most appropriate sentence?
The trial court rejected this question because ofits broadness and argumentative nature. The court implied that a proper question would only address
the venireperson's ability to impose the death sentence. The Virginia
Supreme Court had upheld the refusal of similar less argumentative
questions in thepast, 35 and the Satchercourtupheld the trial court's refusal
to allow this question as well.
In so doing, the court distinguished Satcher from the United States
Supreme Court's recent ruling in Morgan v. Illinois.36 In Morgan, the
Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury
was violated by the trial court's refusal to inquire whether prospective
37
jurors would vote automatically for the imposition of the death penalty.
The trial court had allowed the prosecutor to ask jurors the Witherspoon
38
question of whether they definitely could not impose the death penalty.
The Supreme Court held in Morgan that general questions respecting a
juror's ability to carry out his duties were inadequate in determining
whether the juror was truly impartial.39 In a capital case, a juror could
answer in good faith that she will follow the law without realizing that she
must be able to consider mitigating evidence in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court concluded that only a
"reverse Witherspoon" question can address that possibility.40
Withlittleelaboration, the VirginiaSupreme Courtheld thatcounsel's
question in this case was significantly different from the question in
4
Morgan,and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing the question. t
In its examination of the record, the court inSatcherfailed to find that any
jurors could not perform their duties as jurors and follow their oaths as
required by law. As a result the court dismissed Satcher's objections. 42
Defense counsel should seek to use Morgan as a means of exploring
juror attitudes on capital sentencing issues. In order to do that, carefully
crafted questions with supporting memoranda are required. Moreover,
Morganappears to allow defense counsel to not only explore jurors' views
on the death penalty generally, but also their abilities to consider certain
types of evidence as mitigating. 43 The United States Supreme Court
recognized in Morgan that a certain amount of equity between the
defendant and the state is necessary during the voir dire process, and
defense counsel should stress this when attempting to ask more elaborate
"reverse Witherspoon" questions.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady

36 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992). See case summary of Morgan,Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
37 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2234 (1992).
38 In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court held
that a venireperson could be excused for cause based on their opposition
to the death penalty only if it would lead them to automatically vote
against the death penalty. A"reverse Witherspoon"question asks whether
ajuror is incapable of imposing a life sentence, but would always vote for
death.
39 Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-33.
40 Id.
41 Satcher, 1992 Va. LEXIS 98 at *17, n.7. See also Mueller v.
Commonwealth, Nos. 920287 and 920449,1992 Va. LEXIS 97 (Sept. 18,
1992). According to the Virginia Supreme Court's recent decision in
Mueller,a trial court need not allow the defense counsel to elaborate on his
question if the voir dire process has sufficiently investigated the possibility
that a juror definitely would or would not impose the death penalty. See
case summary of Mueller, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
42 Id. at *22.
43 For suggested lines of questioning, see case summary of
Morgan, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.

